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Summary
This research explored the attitudes and behaviours of Department for Work and Pensions 
(DWP’s) ‘self-employed’ child maintenance paying parents towards the payment of child 
maintenance. It identified levers for, and barriers to, positive behaviour change. Using a 
behavioural insight approach, research explored both current attitudes and behaviours 
around the Child Support Agency (CSA) and likely responses and behaviour under the new 
Child Maintenance Service (CMS). It presents findings based on a mixed-method qualitative 
study, including 47 total respondents, conducted iteratively over two stages of fieldwork.
The report is divided into the following chapters:
• Chapter 1 provides initial context regarding the background to, and objectives of, the 
research, the methods used and research sample.
• Chapter 2 briefly explores the range of contexts, income levels and attitudes towards work 
observed in the ‘self-employed’ audience.
• Chapter 3 introduces the TNS ‘Behaviour Web’ and maps the range of behavioural, 
attitudinal and practical barriers to, and triggers for, compliance – under the CSA system.
• Chapter 4 explores paying parents’ response to key aspects of the new CMS system; 
potential windows of opportunity, risks of the new system in terms of promoting more 
compliant behaviour, use of alternative maintenance arrangements and initial experiences 
under CMS thus far.
• Chapter 5 presents respondents’ reported communication and support needs around 
CMS in terms of providing clarity around the system changes and encouraging positive 
behaviour change.
• Chapter 6 summarises our overall conclusions and recommendations, including additional 
communications and support needs that may enable more positive behaviour change, as 
well as other potential levers that may be beneficial given what we know about what drives 
compliant child maintenance behaviour.
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Glossary of terms
Child Maintenance Service A government agency responsible for the assessment and 
collection of compulsory child maintenance payments. 
Established in 2012, it will eventually replace the Child 
Support Agency.
Child Support Agency A government agency responsible for the assessment and 
collection of compulsory child maintenance payments. 
The Child Support Agency is closing, and existing Child 
Support Agency cases will close as a result.
Direct Pay An arrangement where the Child Maintenance Service 
calculates the amount of child maintenance to be paid. 
Both parents agree between themselves when and how 
the payments are made. There is a one-off application fee.
Family-based arrangement An arrangement, which both the paying and receiving 
parent have come to by themselves without involving the 
Child Support Agency or Child Maintenance Service.
Heuristics In behavioural economics, this term is used to describe 
cognitive shortcuts or ‘rules of thumb’ that people use to 
simplify decisions. An example of this is availability bias 
– where people overestimate the probability of things that 
they are easily able to think of examples of, and vice versa.
Paying parent The parent who lives in a separate household from the 
child/ren. In this report the term paying parent may refer 
to either a Child Maintenance Service or Child Support 
Agency client.
Receiving parent The parent who lives in the same household as the 
child/ren for whom maintenance has been applied for or 
is being paid. In this report the term paying parent may 
refer to either a Child Maintenance Service or Child 
Support Agency client.
Statutory child maintenance A maintenance arrangement which is set up with the 
arrangement  help of the courts or Child Support Agency/Child 
Maintenance Service to ensure separated parents 
set-up appropriate support for their child/ren in line 
with their income.
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Executive summary
This research explored the attitudes and behaviours of Department for Work and Pensions 
(DWP’s) ‘self-employed’ child maintenance paying parents towards the payment of child 
maintenance. It presents findings from two waves of qualitative research with paying parents, 
conducted between November 2013 and February 2014.
The child maintenance system is in a critical time of change, as the Child Support Agency 
(CSA) closes its cases and cases open in the new Child Maintenance Service (CMS). 
The CMS has introduced a range of charges, alongside other system changes, in order to 
promote more compliant payment within the statutory system, and to promote considerations 
of alternative arrangements such as Direct Pay and family-based arrangements. Specifically, 
the CMS system introduces:
• application charges: consisting of a one-off fee of £20 for parents wishing to set up a new 
statutory child maintenance arrangement through CMS;
• collection charges: involving a 20 per cent fee for paying parents and a four per cent fee 
for receiving parents, to be deducted from each child maintenance payment; and
• enforcement charges: applied at a flat rate for each enforcement action.
TNS BMRB was commissioned by DWP to provide insight on:
• what drives CSA self-employed paying parents to be non-compliant; and
• the likely effects of the new CMS system upon the attitudes and behaviours of this audience.
Research also explored potential communications and support needs to smooth the 
introduction of the new system and support positive behaviour change.
Background
Findings by other government departments indicate reduced levels of understanding 
in relation to financial obligations among the self-employed, compared to the general 
population, and in some cases normalisation of non-compliant attitudes – for example, 
regarding poor timeliness of tax filing with Her Majesty’s Revenue & Customs (HMRC).
It is hoped that the changes to the child maintenance system will help to:
• prevent the growth of arrears by making paying on time the norm;
• reduce the potential for arrears by helping parents to make regular, on-time payments, and 
providing swift enforcement for those who deliberately avoid their responsibilities;
• support a move towards independence via flexible, family-based arrangements and Direct 
Pay options; and
• improve the client experience, by introducing targeted communications such as payment 
reminder services and guides to help parents understand the statutory maintenance system.
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Methodology
Using a behavioural insight approach, research explored both current attitudes and 
behaviours around the CSA and likely responses and behaviour under the CMS. Findings 
are based on a mixed-method qualitative study, including 47 total respondents (both 
‘compliant’ and ‘non-compliant’), conducted iteratively over two stages of fieldwork. 
Qualitative individual and paired depth interviews were conducted, as well as trios and small 
focus group sessions.
The rationale for selecting the sample was not to recruit a statistically representative sample of 
the target audience, but to ensure diversity of coverage across certain key variables (purposive 
sampling). Whilst research can provide evidence around the range of issues that may affect 
compliance for this audience, it is thus not appropriate to draw conclusions about prevalence of 
these in the wider audience of self-employed, child maintenance paying parents.
Key findings
Self-employment
This research found that for child maintenance purposes, paying parents self-categorised 
their self-employment status. This has led to the miscategorisation of some individuals 
on the DWP child maintenance database; some paying parents who DWP believed to be 
self-employed were in fact essentially unemployed, or working very few hours per month. 
Barriers to compliance for self-employed parents were thus not just around variation in 
income but also around having very low income flow, and lack of affordability.
As income was a key driver of non-compliance for some, it is possible that non-compliance 
amongst the self-employed audience may be partially explained by income alone. Further 
investigation on the self-employed sample is required to determine the size of low income/
unemployed in this group.
There was also some minimal evidence of ‘strategic unemployment’, with individuals 
choosing to register as self-employed for child maintenance purposes in order to have more 
control over their maintenance liability.
Reasons for using the statutory system
Perhaps unsurprisingly, conflict and communication breakdown between parents and ex-
partners were key drivers for the need for statutory services. This was based on mistrust 
about how the child maintenance paid by the paying parent was being spent by the receiving 
parent. Or it was linked to disputes around payment amount or frequency of payment. The 
statutory system was viewed by many paying parents as a punishment from their ex-partner, 
for example, following disputes. This background of conflict and tension underplays paying 
parents’ responses to the statutory system itself – as their relationships with ex-partners 
could influence their response to the CSA/CMS, potentially reducing motivation to comply.
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Reasons for non-compliance under the current system (CSA)
Although reasons for non-compliance included income or issues arising from self-
employment, many other reasons were also observed. Barriers to compliance included:
• inability to afford payments due to low or fluctuating income;
• prioritisation of other bills (e.g., related to ‘survival’ such as rent and heating, work-related 
expenses, or bills with high costs for non-compliance). This seemed linked to a perception 
that the cost of non-compliance was low; respondents felt that response from the CSA 
after non-payment was often delayed or unpredictable;
• a perception that liability calculations and payment schedules were unfair and did not 
adequately take into account other factors such as income flow, periods of sickness, 
support provided outside the statutory system, system errors, etc. Clear (written and 
verbal) communication and explanation about how liability is calculated could help reduce 
barriers around illegitimacy. More transparent procedures around how to adjust (perceived) 
incorrect liability amounts are also required;
• a perception that child maintenance payments were not being spent on the child – at times 
resulting in complete rejection of statutory maintenance obligations. Paying parents wished 
to see measures or communications in place to alleviate their concerns;
• resentment about government ‘interfering’ in personal affairs and focusing only on financial 
child support. This can result in a framing of child maintenance payments as merely 
‘paying the CSA’ rather than linking it with supporting their child;
• negative experiences with the CSA including system errors, perceived disorganisation or 
inflexible and ‘judgmental’ tone of staff further undermined its legitimacy for some;
• a perception that paying parents were ‘treated as criminals’ and assumed to be at fault, 
even when they were willing to pay. Many parents thus felt morally justified in ‘fighting 
back’ with non-compliance.
Responses to CMS and likely behaviour under the new system
The key windows of opportunity around the CMS seem to centre around the ability of 
charges to combat a sense of limited cost of non-compliance, inspiring more loss aversion 
via the desire to avoid collection or enforcement charges. This may help disrupt current 
habits of non-compliance and result in greater prioritisation of child maintenance for those 
that can afford to pay. However, charges also raise risks in terms of amplifying some of 
the existing barriers to compliance as outlined above.
Respondents were positive about the introduction of an application fee, but did not think it 
was high enough to deter many receiving parents, particularly if respondents felt the system 
was being used by ex-partners to ‘punish them’. 
Collection charges intensified the perception that child maintenance payments were 
paid for a government service rather than benefiting their child. Respondents expressed 
keenness to avoid collection charges under the CMS system in theory, but given poor 
relationships with ex-partners doubted whether they would be able to move to Direct Pay or 
family-based arrangements without support or mediation.
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Parents who would be willing, but unable, to pay via Direct Pay or make family-based 
arrangements thus felt they would be being ‘forced’ into a statutory system and ‘punished’ 
through collection charges. Additional charges (including enforcement charges) not only raised 
real concerns about ability to pay, but aggravated perceptions that the system would unfairly 
penalise fathers. Some respondents stated that their frustration would cause them to stop 
payment outright or to find ways to ‘game the system’ and minimise their liability calculation. 
Clear and explicit guidance about how to set up Direct Pay or family-based arrangements 
when communication with ex-partners is poor will thus be key in enabling parents to do so. 
Experiences of the CMS so far
Understanding and direct experience of the CMS was fairly limited within the research 
sample. Many of those transitioning from the CSA were not aware that they had been moved 
into a ‘new’ system or what was different about this, and most of those with new cases had 
only limited contact with the system thus far. Any communication that works to ‘rebrand’ 
or distance the CMS from the CSA system could help dissociate CMS from the negative 
reputation of the CSA.
Amongst the limited numbers of those who had interacted with the CMS, there was some 
positive feedback about improved communications, as CMS staff had adopted a more 
positive and encouraging tone, leading to positive views of the system. Continuing this tone 
of flexibility and helpfulness will be strongly beneficial to shifting parents’ relationships with 
CMS and attitudes to compliance.
Amongst those in the CMS, the research found evidence of resentment around feelings of 
being ‘forced’ into a statutory system despite being willing to pay directly, and being unable 
to do so due to relationship-based issues and communication difficulties with ex-partners. 
14
Attitudes and behaviours of self-employed child maintenance clients and barriers to 
paying child maintenance
1 Introduction
The child maintenance system is in a critical time of change, as the Child Support Agency (CSA) 
transitions its statutory maintenance provision over to the new Child Maintenance Service 
(CMS). The CMS has introduced a range of charges, alongside other system changes, in order 
to promote more compliant payment within the statutory system, and to promote considerations 
of alternative arrangements such as Direct Pay and family-based arrangements.
The Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) commissioned TNS BRMB to provide insight 
on: 
• what drives CSA self-employed paying parents to be compliant/non-compliant; and 
• the likely effects of the new CMS system upon the attitudes and behaviours of this audience. 
Research also explored potential communications and support needs to smooth the introduction 
of the new system and support positive behaviour change in relation to compliance.
This report presents findings from two waves of qualitative research with paying parents, 
conducted between November 2013 and February 2014. In total, research included 47 
respondents – both compliant and non-compliant – via individual depth interviews, paired 
depth interviews, ‘trios’ and small focus group sessions.1 As detailed in the following 
sections, these findings explore triggers and barriers to compliance as related specifically to 
respondents’ self-employment and income status, but also broader issues that may be useful 
to take into account when considering potential levers for positive behaviour change.
1.1 Setting the context 
It is the Government’s view that more needs to be done to encourage parents to think about 
their responsibilities when relationships break down – helping ensure that children’s needs 
are met, even during difficult economic circumstances.2 Policy development has prioritised 
the need to promote positive family relationships and build resilience to future problems.
Although the majority of parents with a statutory child maintenance case do keep up to date 
with their financial obligations, the Department is currently struggling with a significant legacy 
of arrears. Between 1993 and 2008, child maintenance debt from parents with cases in 
arrears was accruing at approximately £20 million per month.3 
1 See Section 1.3 of this report for full methodological details.
2 Strengthening families, promoting parental responsibility: the future of child 
maintenance (2011). Department for Work and Pensions. www.gov.uk/government/
consultations/strengthening-families-promoting-parental-responsibility-the-future-of-
child-maintenance
3 Preparing for the Future, tackling the past: Child Maintenance arrears and compliance 
strategy, 2012 – 2017. Department for Work and Pensions. www.gov.uk/government/
publications/preparing-for-the-future-tackling-the-past-child-maintenance-arrears-and-
compliance-strategy-2012-to-2017
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Certain parent groups may contribute to this overall debt (and lack of family provision). 
Research findings, by other Government departments, relating to the self-employed indicate 
there is a reduced understanding of financial obligations among this group compared to 
the general population. In some cases there is normalisation of non-compliant attitudes, for 
example, regarding poor timeliness and correctness of tax filing with Her Majesty’s Revenue 
and Customs (HMRC).4 
As part of its ongoing efforts to support separating parents to provide for dependent 
children, even when relationships break down, DWP has begun to transition its statutory 
child maintenance provision from the CSA to the CMS. Established in 2012, the new CMS 
service will continue to offer a government-provided ‘safety net’ for parents who are not able 
to make their own arrangements. The new system introduces a series of charges to provide 
a financial incentive for families to make their own arrangements (via family-level based 
agreements rather than statutory services), and for parents to make support payments in full 
and on time.
Specifically, the CMS system has introduced:
• application fees: consisting of a one-off application fee of £20 for parents wishing to set 
up a new statutory child maintenance arrangement through the CMS system;
• collection charges: a 20 per cent charge for paying parents and a four per cent charge 
for receiving parents, to be deducted from each child maintenance payment; and
• enforcement charges: applied at a flat rate for each enforcement action.
It is hoped that the changes to the child maintenance system will help to:
• prevent the growth of arrears by making paying on time the norm;
• reduce the potential for arrears by helping parents to make regular, on-time 
payments, and providing swift enforcement action to those who deliberately avoid their 
responsibilities;
• support a move towards independence via flexible, family-based arrangements and 
Direct Pay options; and
• improve the client experience, by introducing targeted communications such as payment 
reminder services and guides to help parents understand the statutory maintenance system.5 
4 Social norms and networks: research into tax compliance of the self-employed. (2010) 
Research conducted for the HMRC. www.hmrc.gov.uk/research/report238.pdf
5 Preparing for the Future, tackling the past: Child Maintenance arrears and compliance 
strategy, 2012 – 2017. Department for Work and Pensions. www.gov.uk/government/
publications/preparing-for-the-future-tackling-the-past-child-maintenance-arrears-and-
compliance-strategy-2012-to-2017
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1.2 Research aims 
This research aimed to understand how to encourage self-employed paying parents to 
be more compliant, and the attitudes, beliefs and practical issues which drive non-
compliant behaviour. It also needed to understand behaviour in the context of the move to 
the CMS system, likely implications of the various financial ‘levers’ in terms of compliance or 
a shift to non-statutory maintenance arrangements, and opportunities for communications to 
promote compliant behaviour. 
The overall research aims were to:
• understand how and why self-employed paying parents are not complying with the 
current statutory maintenance system (CSA) – identifying what distinguishes them from 
compliant parents, in terms of their motivations, habits and behaviours;
• understand how currently non-compliant self-employed paying parents are likely to 
act under the new system (CMS), given their reasons for not complying at the moment; 
• identify communications and support that might encourage positive behaviour change, 
in terms of:
 – actively budgeting for child maintenance;
 – becoming compliant within statutory arrangements; and/or 
 – arranging family-based or Direct Pay agreements;
• understand ideal communications channels for the above.
Across these broad objectives, specific research aims were to:
• explore in-depth and understand the attitudes of self-employed paying parents and their 
motivations to pay/not pay child maintenance;
• understand the behaviours that drive self-employed paying parents to miss payments and 
fall into arrears;
• identify and explore in depth the barriers to paying child maintenance that are 
experienced by self-employed paying parents;
• examine the extent to which self-employed paying parents have differing experiences of 
child maintenance depending on whether they have a case under the CSA or new CMS 
system;
• identify the extent to which self-employed parents consider that charging will encourage 
them to put a family-based or Direct Pay arrangement in place;
• understand paying parents’ current communication, media and channel preferences to 
help identify opportunities to influence these;
• identify if communications could make a difference to attitudes towards, for example, 
support to help self-employed paying parents budget and pay child maintenance; 
• provide recommendations for designing/improving communication materials for parents 
in order to improve the client experience and improve compliance.
17
Attitudes and behaviours of self-employed child maintenance clients and barriers to 
paying child maintenance
1.3 Research approach and sample
Research used an iterative, multi-method approach to provide robust behavioural insight 
about the target audience. Following a briefing meeting with the DWP client and research 
teams, research began with an exploratory stage of ten depth interviews with self-employed 
paying parents to generate initial insight about attitudes, behaviours and practical issues 
influencing compliance for this group. Following iterative sharing of emerging findings, the 
research sample and approach was revised for a second stage of research, consisting of a 
mix of depth interviews, paired-depths, trios and focus groups. Stage two was comprised of 
37 respondents in total. Full sample details across research can be found in Section 1.3.3.
This flexible, responsive and exploratory approach enabled the research to generate richer 
and more detailed insights. This included investigating the more subtle and complex factors 
that underpinned views and behaviour around child maintenance. 
As this was a qualitative study, the rationale for selecting the sample was not to recruit a 
statistically representative sample of the target audience, but to ensure diversity of coverage 
across certain key variables (purposive sampling). All participants were recruited via DWP’s 
internal child maintenance sample. Eligibility for the research was determined using a short 
screening questionnaire and quotas were set in order to prescribe the distribution of the 
sample selected.
To ensure consistency of coverage across the focus groups and interviews, facilitators 
followed a detailed topic guide that outlined the topics that were to be addressed. Separate 
topic guides were developed for each wave of research, and for compliant versus non-
compliant paying parents. Although topic guides help to ensure systematic coverage of key 
issues across interviews, they are used flexibly, to allow issues of relevance for individual 
respondents to be covered through follow-up questioning. 
We discuss each aspect of the research as follows.
1.3.1 Stage 1 – exploratory depth interviews
In stage one, ten 90-minute depth interviews with paying parents (both compliant and non-
compliant) provided initial insights about the range of factors influencing attitudes, beliefs 
and behaviours around child maintenance. Depth interviews provided a private, comfortable 
environment in which to explore respondents’ experiences and attitudes specifically, and 
around budgeting more widely. Customer journey mapping and elements of guided recall 
aided systematic documentation of interviewees’ response to child maintenance obligations 
and communications. Summaries of the key features of the new child maintenance system 
were also introduced as relevant and potential responses to these were systematically mapped 
against respondents’ current contexts and behaviour patterns under CSA.
The recruitment and fieldwork process for stage one revealed a clear influence of respondents’ 
employment status and income levels on attitudes and behaviours around financial 
management – as well as a high degree of variability in what constituted ‘self-employment’ 
in the sample. This included both individuals traditionally considered ‘self-employed’ – i.e., 
meeting HMRC’s definitions of self-employment – but also individuals who were more 
minimally employed or even unemployed and claiming Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA).6 The 
research approach for the remainder of research was revised in light of this early finding.
6 See Section 2.1 for details.
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Following stage one interviewing, early hypotheses and research findings were shared with 
DWP. Stimuli for stage two research were developed – including short ‘profiles’ summarising 
different paying parent types and their contextual barriers and triggers for compliance.
1.3.2 Stage 2 – depths, paired depths, trios and group 
discussions
Stage two extended early findings with a larger sample to test, refine and expand initial 
insights. Initially, stage two was intended to comprise of seven focus groups with paying 
parents – segmented by parents’ compliance status and statutory system of use (i.e., CSA 
or CMS). However, the fairly limited (particularly in the CMS audience) and geographically 
diverse sample posed challenges for a focus group-only approach. Additionally, the clear 
importance of respondents’ employment status and income levels required a revision of 
the intended sample, to ensure that we could explore the impact of this factor in depth, and 
avoid mixing high-income and low-income groups.7
In light of the above, stage two consisted of a range of depth interviews, paired depth 
interviews, trios and small focus groups. Depth interviews were undertaken as necessary to 
ensure coverage across the key variables of interest (compliance status, statutory system of 
use, and income levels) within the geographically disparate sample. Paired depth sessions, 
trios and small focus groups were conducted where possible given the constraints of the 
sample, and where mixing of respondents was useful and appropriate. Where mixed sessions 
were held, these were always split by compliance status, system of use and income levels.8
Where focus groups were held, these were smaller in size (up to six participants in each 
focus group) to allow more time for discussion and to build the group dynamic more easily.  
By bringing together people in similar circumstances, the focus groups were designed to 
ensure participants would feel comfortable about discussing their experiences around child 
maintenance – including barriers to compliant payment.
7 Particularly when discussing non-compliant behaviour around child maintenance, it 
would have been inappropriate to include high-income parents and those who were 
minimally or unemployed in focus group sessions. The stage one findings suggested 
that reasons for non-compliance were very different, and we did not want heterogeneity 
around income streams and discomfort around discussing finance to inhibit honest 
discussion in research sessions.
8 That is, sessions with multiple respondents were always homogeneous in terms of 
parents’ compliance status, system of use, and income level.
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1.3.3 Sampling and recruitment
Figure 1.1 Research sample 
 
All participants were recruited via DWP’s internal child maintenance sample. Reassurance 
was provided around TNS BMRB’s independence and neutrality, and of the confidentiality 
and anonymity of respondents’ discussions.
As a thank-you payment for lending their time to research, incentives were provided.
Data capture and analysis
All research sessions were digitally recorded, and the material collected was subject to a 
thematic content analysis which provides both rigour and transparency without losing the 
benefits of intuition and creative thinking. Analysis drew upon TNS BMRB’s Behaviour Web 
to structure thinking and reporting around the range of triggers and barriers for compliant 
payment of child maintenance, and likely windows or opportunities for the changes 
introduced under CMS in terms of promoting positive behaviour change.
The following qualitative findings have been illustrated with the use of case studies, 
quotations and examples. These are used to bring the findings to life and are drawn from 
across the sample. The purposive nature of the sample, however, means that the study 
cannot provide any statistical data relating to the prevalence of these views and experiences.
Revised approach
Wave 1
• 8 CSA depths (5 NC, 3 C)
• 2 CMS depths (2 no status)
Wave 2
• 4 CSA mini-groups (2 NC, 2 C)
• 8 CSA depths (4 NC, 4 C)
• 1 CMS triads
• 1 CMS paired depths
• 4 CMS depths
• Sampled for employment  
(by hours worked/income)
Final sample: 47 total 
respondents (11 CMS, 36 CSA)
Geographic coverage across 
Birmingham, Leeds, Coventry, 
Newcastle, London;  
5 young parents (under 25);
26 non-compliant,  
19 complaint,  
2 ‘null’ compliance
Key 
NC = non-compliant, C = compliant, ‘null’ compliance = compliance data not available
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2 Context to the current 
research
This chapter sets out two key issues which broadly informed respondents’ experience of 
and response to the statutory child maintenance system. First, we introduce the impact of 
variability in ‘self-employment’ evidenced in the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP’s) 
child maintenance sample, and the influence of this variability on respondents’ ability and 
willingness to comply. Second, we briefly summarise respondents’ journey into use of 
the statutory system and the impact of this on how they view the system and their child 
maintenance obligations.
2.1 Understanding ‘self-employment’
Officially, ‘self-employed’ status is not a choice; whether someone is considered employed 
or self-employed is defined by the terms and conditions of their working arrangements.9 
However, under the Child Support Agency (CSA), parents currently self-categorise their 
employment status for child maintenance purposes. Because of this self-categorisation 
approach, parents who are registered as self-employed with the CSA do not necessarily 
fit the official (i.e., Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC)) definition of ‘self-
employment’. Rather, status depends on whether parents understand the official rules 
around the self-employment designation, and whether they choose an employment status 
which accurately reflects their employment circumstances. 
Early recruitment and fieldwork for this research clearly evidenced that ‘self-employment’ as 
designated in the DWP child maintenance sample included a broad range of employment 
types and levels – as well as occasional misunderstanding of the official rules around who is 
and isn’t considered to be ‘self-employed’. Overall, the sample contained three broad types 
of worker, summarised below.
Rather than being fully evidenced categories, these typologies were based on early 
research findings; research did not seek to establish exact work histories in terms of 
income and work history, and relied exclusively on participants to provide information about 
employment context.10 However, they provide a useful shorthand summary of the variability 
of employment context in evidence across the sample.
9 For example, HMRC’s formal definition of self-employment takes into account a range 
of common law principles around whether individuals are able to hire others to 
complete required tasks, whether own equipment is provided, whether working 
arrangements rely on fix priced agreements versus salaried or per-hour arrangements, 
etc. For a summary of conditions see www.hmrc.gov.uk/employment-status/#1 
10 In the context of a sensitive research subject such as child maintenance and financial 
compliance, extensive questioning around respondents’ income levels and work 
situations would likely both hamper recruitment and discourage respondent trust of 
research and moderators. In recruitment, the issue of employment status was explored 
via a ‘hours per week worked’ self-report measure. Employment status (number and 
type of jobs held, contracting arrangements, etc.) were explored within the research 
sessions themselves.
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The three broad categories included the:
• regularly self-employed – i.e., those who meet the HMRC definitions of ‘self-
employment’, and who work full time or close to full time as a self-employed worker. 
Usually, these individuals had a set occupation or career rather than multiple part-time 
streams of income. This category of respondent could include both higher and lower 
income, but overall tended to have a higher level of work hours and income levels as 
compared to other groups in the sample.
• limited self-employment – i.e., individuals who had more limited and variable income 
overall, and tended not to be working full-time or near full-time hours. Respondents in this 
category often had more income-related difficulties paying child maintenance; for example, 
struggling to pay basic bills every month and to maintain compliance around child 
maintenance payments. In this group there was more evidence of multiple job-holdings, 
although there were also respondents with one set occupation – albeit one that tended not 
to provide (near) full-time hours and corresponding income security.
Many individuals in this category met HMRC’s definitions of ‘self-employment’ but some 
did not – e.g., there was evidence of individuals on ‘zero hours’ contracts who, lacking the 
benefits and protections of traditional contracted employment (e.g., set income, sick pay, 
etc.) incorrectly perceived themselves as ‘self-employed’, despite being paid via Pay as You 
Earn (PAYE). Overall, there was evidence of confusion of exactly what constituted ‘self-
employment’ and suggestions that some individuals may miscategorise themselves. This did 
not seem to correspond to an overarching strategy to incorrectly identify as self-employed for 
tax purposes; rather, respondents seemed to be making a ‘best guess’ choice at the point of 
self-identification in the child maintenance system.
Within this category, there was also some (minimal) evidence of ‘strategic’ self-employment; 
respondents who preferred to remain self-employed, or registered as self-employed under 
more complex working arrangements, in order to maintain more control over the amount 
of income declared and thus the calculation of child maintenance liability.11 Although this 
was infrequent in the research sample, it does suggest that the ‘self-employed’ category 
may contain some individuals who are less disposed to comply overall, and are actively 
seeking to reduce their liability by declaring themselves as self-employed. In one case, the 
respondent reported that he had been advised by a third party (Citizens’ Advice Bureau) to 
declare himself as self-employed in order to retain more control over his child maintenance 
liability. Another few individuals noted that they preferred to remain self-employed to avoid 
direct withdrawals of child maintenance from their pay cheque.
‘CSA is the reason I stay self-employed, because if you’re employed they can take 
payments straight off your wages, straight out of the company … With them being 
unpredictable, and unorganised, they can hit you whenever they want 
(Compliant)
‘Citizens Advice Bureau told me that I should say I was self-employed because I was 
worried about having enough money to make the payments … so to register as the 
self-employed teaching job instead of my other work.’ 
(Non-compliant)
11 For example, when holding multiple jobs – some as a self-employed service provider, 
and some as a paid worker.
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• Essentially unemployed – i.e., individuals who had limited or no income at the point of 
interview. For those with limited income, this tended to consist of only one or two days of 
work per month, with some evidence of grey market labour participation – for example, 
with the only income streams being small and unpredictable cash in hand work via 
gardening or leafleting jobs. 
For some in this group, ‘self-employment’ seemed to be an outdated classification, based 
on an earlier employment status when still in work. For others, it seemed to reflect a 
personal choice to identify as ‘self-employed’ rather than ‘unemployed’ when choosing their 
own employment status in the CSA system – perhaps a response to the stigma of being 
‘unemployed.’ 
Most respondents in this group were currently claiming benefits (i.e., Jobseeker’s Allowance 
(JSA)) or had done so in the past. For non-compliant respondents currently on benefits, 
there was some confusion about how they could have garnished non-compliant status, 
given that child maintenance payments were taken directly from their JSA. There was little 
understanding of how outstanding arrears might influence compliance status.
As noted above, the importance of respondents’ employment status and income levels 
were quickly identified as a key driver of behaviour and attitudes around child maintenance. 
Those with very minimal incomes, and those that were currently unemployed, reported 
that they found it difficult if not impossible to budget for and pay child maintenance in a 
compliant fashion (see Section 3.1.3 below for more details). Although other barriers around 
compliance were often in evidence as well, as discussed below, these individuals maintained 
that they simply did not have the means to pay, and did not view compliant payment (or 
catching up on arrears) as a feasible choice.
The purposive sampling approach taken in this research cannot provide evidence against 
the extent of unemployment and minimal employment in DWP ‘self-employed’ child 
maintenance sample. However, it would suggest that further research and analysis is 
needed to understand the degree to which income levels differ in this group versus the child 
maintenance sample at large, and thus the degree to which rates of non-compliance in the 
self-employed group is driven by income-related issues. As we will discuss in more depth, 
it also suggests there may be a need for more targeted approaches to promote positive 
behaviour change – with different communications and supports required for those who do 
not perceive that they have the choice to comply, versus those who have the means to do so 
but currently chose not to.
2.2 Journey to use of the statutory system
Whilst it was not the primary purpose of this research to explore exhaustively the specific 
circumstances and processes by which people separated and became engaged in the 
statutory child maintenance system, this was briefly explored in research sessions in order 
to provide contextual insight around respondents’ attitudes towards ex-partners and towards 
the statutory system itself. 
Unsurprisingly, parents frequently reported that their relationships with ex-partners were 
fraught with conflict and turmoil. Frequently, communication was considered to be extremely 
difficult, ‘patchy’ or to have broken down completely. Some respondents had infrequent or 
no contact at all with their children as they had been unable to agree visitation arrangements 
with receiving parents. This conflict and communication difficulty was reported as a 
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fundamental driver for the use of statutory service.; Many respondents indicated that they 
would prefer to pay via private arrangements – or indeed, to simply share care for the child/
ren in question– but did not consider this feasible given the lack of productive contact with 
ex-partners.
‘People go to CSA for a reason, because there’s been a breakdown. Was it because he 
was a nightmare, she was a nightmare, or they just mutually agreed to separate. Those 
people who mutually agreed can probably sort it out, the others can’t.’ 
(Compliant, 16+ hours/week, Birmingham, CSA, Group)
Some respondents were visibly emotional during research discussions. Many were upset 
that they did not have closer and more productive relationships with their children and, in 
some cases, ex-partners. Whilst there was some evidence of paying parents who were 
more detached about their obligations to support their children, the majority of respondents 
in research voiced opinions that they would prefer to negotiate alternative arrangements. 
Arms-length support – focused on financial support rather than in-person care – was typically 
viewed as a frustratingly unsatisfying alternative to more embedded involvement in their 
children’s lives. Respondents were often angry and frustrated with ex-partners, if they were 
not viewed as helping enable closer parental involvement, and some voiced a sense of 
helplessness to change their circumstances.
Whilst the sensitive and typically negative emotional and practical circumstances driving the 
use of statutory systems are perhaps not surprising, they are worth highlighting at the outset. 
These relationship contexts had strong influence on respondents’ attitudes and behaviours 
around child maintenance, as we will discuss in the sections to follow, with their experiences 
and histories with ex-partners often presenting significant barriers to compliance.
There were two broad categories in terms of respondents’ journeys towards statutory system 
use: those who had no previous experience of private arrangements and non-statutory 
payment, and those who had entered the statutory system after private arrangements broke 
down. Each is briefly discussed as follows. 
2.2.1 No previous experience of family-based arrangements
This group included some parents who had entered statutory arrangements following 
relationship breakdown and/or legal custody battles, as well as individuals who had not 
previously been in contact with their ex-partner around child maintenance obligations. 
In many cases, statutory system use was a response to disagreements and conflict between 
parents – for example, due to disagreements about the amount of money that should have 
been paid, or around questions of paternity and obligations for support. In some cases, 
a lack of contact between parents meant that the respondent was not aware of why the 
statutory case was initially opened; a request for maintenance via the statutory system had 
been either the first contact around child maintenance, or indeed the first notification of 
paternity of the child in question. 
However, there was also some suggestion that individuals entered the system ‘by default’, 
for example, assuming that when relationships broke down the statutory system was the 
typical or only way forward to arrange maintenance. These individuals thus did not have any 
experience of attempting to negotiate family-based or other non-statutory arrangements.
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2.2.2 Statutory involvement following breakdowns of family-
based arrangements
Alternatively, many respondents in the sample reported that they had initially engaged 
in family-based arrangements, but that a statutory case had been opened up following 
disagreements or increased conflict with ex-partners. 
When instigated by the paying parent, statutory cases had often been opened to secure 
evidence of payments and ‘protection’ against claims that maintenance had not been paid, 
or due to suspicions that money provided was not being appropriately spent on the child 
(particularly in cases where there were concerns about alcohol or substance use). 
Where the statutory case had been opened by the ex-partner, this was reported as being due 
to a wide range of circumstances. For example, this may have been due to disagreements 
about the amount of maintenance to be paid; changes in circumstances for one or both 
partners (e.g., new children which might affect a parents’ financial circumstances; a history of 
private payments being infrequent/inconsistent; or new circumstances around income which 
reduced the paying parents’ ability to provide maintenance (e.g., sickness, unemployment, 
reduced income, etc.).
Respondents also frequently reported a perception that ex-partners reactively opened 
statutory arrangements ‘as a punishment’ following disputes, or even reported that the 
‘threat’ of statutory involvement was used ‘strategically’ at times. 
‘I’ve got to pay my rent or I’m out on the street. I need my phone for work … She’s 
got enough money – I know she’s doing things on the side – I know she’s got enough 
money coming she’s just doing it to be spiteful.’ 
(Non-compliant)
 
‘She did that purely to cause me grief.’ 
(Non-compliant, 16+, CSA)
This positioning of the CSA as a ‘punishment’ was in direct conflict with a more optimistic and 
helpful potential narrative of ‘using the system to help support my child.’ As we will explore 
in greater detail to follow, if respondents perceived the CSA as an extension of their difficult 
relationship with their ex-partners, or as a third-party body which was not legitimately acting 
in the best interests of their child, this could strongly reduce motivation to comply. 
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3 Barriers to and triggers of 
compliance for CSA self-
employed paying parents
This chapter explores the attitudinal, behavioural and practical drivers of non-compliance 
for Child Support Agency (CSA) self-employed paying parents, and factors which seemed 
to be associated with more compliant behaviour. Findings in this section draw on data from 
respondents registered with the CSA, at the time of the survey, as well as those who had 
transitioned from the CSA to the new Child Maintenance Service (CMS). 
3.1 Drivers of non-compliance under CSA
Each research session included elements of: 
• context-setting (for example, discussing general employment circumstances, budgeting 
behaviour and family status), 
• child maintenance process mapping (mapping out in detail respondents’ current process of 
planning for and paying child maintenance) and
• specific questioning around responses to the CSA (for example, questioning response to 
notifications around arrears).
This combination of more exploratory and structured mapping exercises provided a 
comprehensive picture of respondents’ current behaviour and attitudes around child 
maintenance, as well as how they interacted with the system itself. Crucially, it helped us 
identify a range of barriers around compliant behaviour within CSA self-employed clients and 
to build a picture of what drives these.
For ease of reference, these barriers are summarised against the various behavioural 
‘drivers’ represented in the TNS ‘Behaviour Web’ in Figure 3.1, below. This provided a 
structure for research discussions and analysis, for example, ensuring that research 
explored more general influences such as costs and benefits, efficacy, social norms and 
habits, and heuristics in respondents’ thinking. 
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Figure 3.1 Summary of drivers of non-compliant behaviour for CSA self-employed 
paying parents
Behaviour is of course complex and multi-faceted – and in some cases, barriers to 
compliance overlap across multiple drivers. 
For example, one common assertion was that non-compliance was partially driven by a 
perception that ‘the CSA is out to get fathers’ rather than acting as a support service to 
benefit children. This represents a package of beliefs containing, for example:
• elements of moral judgement (it’s wrong for you to judge me and reduce my relationship 
with my child to one of financial payment); 
• social and cultural norms (the Government doesn’t serve me, so why should I play along); 
and
• reduced legitimacy around requests for payment (the payment benefits you, not my child – 
that’s why you’re chasing me). 
Further details are provided against each behavioural driver in the sections to follow.
Behaviour
Morality
Social 
and 
Cultural 
Norms
Costs and 
Benefits
Efficacy
Legitimacy
Habit
Heuristics
Physical 
Environment
Reduced access – less moral pull 
‘Wrong’ to monetise relationship 
with child 
Child’s welfare does not depend 
on CSA 
Feel victimised and judged
Becomes the norm not to 
pay on time
If new to self-employment, 
no planning systems in 
place
Available bias (Cant’ 
‘see’ where the money 
goes; overestimate in-
person payments?)
 No real ‘loss aversion’
CSA viewed as 
disorganised, hard to 
work with 
Lack of flexibility
Timing of contract
CSA is out to get Dads
You don’t own me/I just don’t 
care!
Normal to be in debt/arrears – 
everyone is struggling financially
Liability is unfair/
incorrect
Payments don’t benefit 
my child – they benefit 
ex-partner/government
Limited income – can I 
pay my bills?
Running out of cash is 
inevitable
Better to be in debt with 
CSA than miss rent/affect 
my credit rating
It’s not worth dipping 
into credit cards and 
overdraft…
Nothing really 
happens…
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3.1.1 Morality
When discussing reasons for non-compliance with statutory maintenance liability under the 
CSA, respondents reported a range of barriers related to perceived lack of moral authority 
of the CSA (or ex-partners) in requesting financial support. Although paying parents were 
typically quick to emphasize that they wanted to ‘do the right thing’ for their children, statutory 
payment did not seem to be successfully linked with this moral driver for many – with the 
CSA instead inhabiting more questionable moral space. 
As discussed above, this was in part due to perceptions that the CSA was used as a 
‘punishment’ by ex-partners rather than a third-party support to help parents in conflict 
provide for their children. In some cases, paying parents felt that financial support via a 
statutory system was not appropriate or desirable (for example, where they would prefer to 
contribute in other ways, or where the receiving parent was perceived as ‘doing well’). This 
was particularly common for individuals who were involved in other ways in their children’s 
lives – for example, via shared care arrangements (e.g., weekly visitations) or non-monetary 
support (e.g., via the direct provision of clothes, nappies, etc.). 
Paying parents also resented the perceived imbalance in responsibility around 
arranging for support of children under the CSA system. That is, they ‘had to’ pay their 
child maintenance payments, but did not feel that the system encouraged the receiving 
parent to consider alternative arrangements or negotiate the terms of child access. This 
could lead to frustration and rejection of the system, particularly from parents who reported 
that they would prefer to be more involved in their child/ren’s lives rather than provide arms-
length support via statutory payment. In this context, the perceived Government emphasis 
on ‘paying what you owe’ could trigger feelings of resentment and anger; respondents 
sometimes felt that the CSA was meddling in family issues without recognising the often 
painful emotional circumstances involved. Paying parents rejected implicit associations 
of non-compliance with child maintenance with stereotypes of the ‘uninvolved father’ or 
‘deadbeat dad.’
‘It should be PAY PER VIEW! You call me and harass me to pay – even though I WANT 
to see my child, it breaks my heart not to have them with me.’ 
(NC)
‘The important thing is taking time and care for my daughter, and I do, and I buy the 
nappies and the food – how dare you say I owe X amount, pay up! It’s not your place.’ 
(NC)
Statutory obligation was thus often linked to a sense of ‘moral injustice’ and sense of mis-
treatment. At times, this was clearly linked to a wider narrative of victimisation around the 
perceived treatment of fathers by the courts. Where paying parents perceived that they were 
treated unfairly by CSA staff, this amplified their sense of moral indignation and sense of 
victimisation. Respondents widely reported that they felt they were treated ‘like a criminal’ 
by CSA staff when they became non-compliant in payment. Again, this approach was felt to 
lack sensitivity in terms of understanding the often complex circumstances involved. Paying 
parents reported feeling ashamed, guilty and angry after contact with CSA staff – which 
seemed to be linked to a resulting impulse to retreat or lash out.
‘Basically they talk to you like you’re scum – you can’t explain yourself to them and if 
you try it falls on deaf ears’ 
(C)
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Finally, some respondents also reported barriers around balancing child maintenance 
obligations against the moral responsibility to care for other loved ones – for example, new 
partners and/or children. Linked to a lack of understanding of how liability was calculated, 
and a lack of perceived ability to adjust liability to reflect changes in family circumstances, 
respondents often felt that the calculated liability did not reflect the full total of their family 
financial obligations. 
3.1.2 Legitimacy
A wide range of barriers around a lack of perceived legitimacy – of the CSA or of the parents’ 
child maintenance liability – also reduced motivation to pay or sometimes resulted in outright 
rejection of statutory obligations. 
Respondents often perceived their calculation of child maintenance as fundamentally unfair 
– both for reasons related to their self-employment as well as wider issues. For example, 
paying parents reported that their calculated liability did not adequately take into account:
• Income flow – e.g., due to seasonal, yearly or constant flux in income due to self-
employment. This could occur during times of illness or unemployment; or at points of 
unexpected difficulty securing adequate income to cover basic survival needs and/or 
other bills (e.g., due to loss of a major contract). Some respondents also raised the issue 
that their financial situation had changed since the year before, and they were uncertain 
whether or how liability could be adjusted to reflect this.
‘There’s no way I can make these amounts…’ 
(C)
• Support provided outside the statutory system – e.g., in situations of shared care, 
or when the parent was providing goods or cash via private arrangement. Those who 
were in regular contact with their children and had a significant amount of shared care 
responsibility were particularly likely to query the legitimacy of statutory payment. There 
were also instances in which respondents’ queried the legitimacy of calculated arrears; 
for example, in cases where a family arrangement had broken down, leading to statutory 
case being opened, but where previously provided payments did not seem to be taken into 
account in retrospective liability calculations.
‘I pay for all the school uniforms and haircuts and stuff but she still chases me for CSA’ 
(NC)
‘My daughter lives with me at least 3 days a week – why isn’t that taken into account?’ 
(NC)
• Ex-partners’ situations or imbalances in financial contexts – e.g., where receiving 
parents were viewed as having the ability to provide for the child independently, or where 
receiving parents had a new partner who also provided financial support. 
• Other financial pressures and obligations – e.g., where respondents felt that the 
addition of new children or partners made it less feasible to meet their child maintenance 
obligations.
Frustrations around the perceived ‘unfairness’ of child maintenance payments were 
exacerbated by respondents’ very low understanding of exactly how liability was 
calculated, what it took into account, and what the procedures were for adjusting liability to 
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reflect changes in circumstances. For example, many respondents were surprised to find out 
that liability could be adjusted to take into account changes in family circumstances (e.g., 
new children). 
There were also instances of requests for payments which parents perceived as incorrect, 
and, as above, a sense of limited efficacy in terms of working within the CSA system to 
adjust arrangements accordingly. For example, in one case a respondent recorded that his 
child had been living full-time with him rather than the receiving parent for over a year. But 
because the receiving parent was the only one who could ‘close the case,’ he was registered 
as non-compliant in the statutory system. In other cases, respondents stated that when 
they had queried the accounts or believed that payments had not been recorded, CSA staff 
had been unable to provide up-to-date details or respond to queries. This could reduce 
perceptions of the system’s integrity and reliability.
Finally, as linked to barriers around the perceived moral status of the child maintenance 
system (see above), many respondents reported that they did not believe that payments 
legitimately benefited their child. For some, this was due to the positioning of the system 
as a ‘punishment’ rather than support, with the money provided linked to ‘meeting one’s 
obligations to the system’ rather than with ‘supporting the child.’ For example, respondents 
sometimes assumed that CSA currently ‘takes a percentage’ or a fee. In others, this was 
linked to suspicions that the receiving parent was not spending the money appropriately, 
and frustrations about the lack of transparency of how financial support was used. Where 
respondents felt that the money collected was misspent, this strongly reduced motivation to 
comply.
‘She gets the payment on Friday – Friday night it goes straight up the nose.’ 
(NC)
‘In effect, I’m probably paying for the drinks with the new fellow.’ 
(C)
3.1.3 Efficacy and Costs/Benefits
This research identified a wide range of barriers related to respondents’ efficacy – that is, 
their ability to successfully budget for and pay their child maintenance in a compliant fashion 
– and calculation of the costs and benefits of compliance. 
Firstly, motivation alone is not sufficient for compliance. In order to maintain compliance, 
paying parents must have adequate income to meet their basic needs and juggle bill 
payments. While many in the sample had adequate income to meet this minimum threshold, 
those with very low or fluctuating income reported that they felt compliance was simply not 
an option; they did not have enough money to meet their day to day living requirements, 
let alone further bills and child maintenance payments. Again, perceived inability to make 
required adjustments to calculated liability exacerbated paying parents’ frustration around 
income-related barriers to compliance, with unemployed or minimally employed individuals 
feeling there was ‘no way out.’
‘It makes you feel horrible, like a horrible man – but how am I supposed to pay?’ 
(NC)
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For those that had adequate income to potentially make child maintenance payments, low 
budgeting ability could also be an issue. Respondents characterised self-employment as 
requiring a ‘juggling act’ – requiring a constant and careful balancing of (often unpredictable) 
incoming funds with the steady stream of outgoing bills and living expenses. Many 
respondents had little experience of putting money aside proactively for future payments, 
and variability in income could also make budgeting tools such as Direct Debit less feasible. 
Again, for some this was linked to histories of low income which allowed for little savings, 
focusing incoming funds on meeting day-to-day expenses. However, there was also some 
evidence of individuals with relatively higher incomes clearly not having the budgeting skills 
required to plan ahead and stay on top of bills; for example, one individual earning over 
£2000 a month with fairly minimal housing and living expenses, who nonetheless felt that 
running out of funds at the end of the month was ‘inevitable.’ 
Within the context of this ‘juggling act’, there was also evidence that child maintenance 
was not prioritised to the same extent as some other payments. For example, respondents 
widely raised that they would prioritise ‘survival’ and job-related costs first – for example, 
rent, utilities, petrol/travel, and job-specific costs such as vehicle insurance. Paying parents 
noted that unless these basic bills were paid, they would be unable to function and work.
‘If I can’t work, they’re not going to get any money out of me at all…’ 
(NC)
Those able to meet their financial obligations beyond these basic costs at times evidenced 
that other payments still took higher priority than child maintenance due to the perceived 
higher cost of non-compliance for other bills. For example, one respondent made the 
point that they would be more likely to make the effort for timely payment for bills which 
affected their credit rating, such as mobile phone contracts. There was also some suggestion 
that bills related to supporting one’s ‘new family’ often took priority, due to the visibility and 
immediacy of feedback when support was not provided. 
Conversely, non-compliance within the CSA was perceived as having only long-term and 
inconsistent costs. Respondents noted that they had experienced long periods of building 
up arrears – either knowingly or mistakenly – before any action was taken. There was 
awareness that the CSA could threaten court action, but this had been experienced only 
after long-term non-compliance, and seemed to be an effective deterrent only for some. The 
most likely and immediate cost of non-payment was typically felt to be ‘harassing’ phone 
calls from CSA staff. Whilst these were widely considered stressful and were motivating for 
some individuals, for those with more habitual patterns of debt and experience with debt 
collection contacts (from the CSA or other bodies) these calls were often simply ignored.
‘It does bother me, but you tune it out – it’s just like any other bill chasing you up.’ 
(NC)
3.1.4 Social and Cultural Norms
Research also identified barriers to compliance related to social and cultural norms – both 
in terms of a lack of stigma around ‘debt’ per se, and in terms of negative perceptions of the 
CSA or the Government helping to legitimise non-compliant responses. 
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For some, particularly for those on lower incomes, there was a clear normalisation of 
debt. Some respondents spoke of debt being ‘unavoidable’ for many in their immediate 
and extended social groups, related either to financial hardship during the recent economic 
downturn or to perceived low opportunities more broadly. Being in arrears with the CSA was 
viewed as comparable to being in debt more generally, and as an inevitable consequence of 
limited incomes. There was also some evidence of a perception that debt is becoming more 
common and socially acceptable across society in general. Overall, the avoidance of debt 
per se was not a hugely motivating trigger for compliance in this group. 
‘Borrowing is a fact of life.’ 
(C)
Negative perceptions of the CSA – via either first-hand experience or second-hand reports 
– also seemed to contribute to the justification of non-compliance for some individuals. For 
example, respondents tended to view non-compliance as the consequence of being ‘unfairly 
treated’ by the CSA rather than as a result of their own personal choices. This could further 
link child maintenance payments to a larger narrative of victimisation (as discussed above in 
Section 3.1.1), rather than more helpful associations (e.g., a way to support my child).
Linked to this, there was also some suggestion that social and cultural norms of rebellion 
against authority or Government – particularly when linked to doubts around the legitimacy 
of the CSA or the payments requested – were contributing to non-compliant behaviour for a 
small number of individuals. 
In its extreme form, this could result in total disengagement with statutory maintenance 
obligations. For example, one individual reported that he chose not to pay child maintenance 
payments because it was another ‘way for the Government to pick your pocket’, as part of 
his personal rebellion against ‘being a slave for the Government.’ Another stated that he was 
not interested in becoming compliant as he was simply not interested in having others telling 
him what to do. 
‘I can just do what I want … I’m not going to pay.’ 
(NC)
There were also suggestions that this impulse furthered non-compliant behaviour more 
widely in the sample, with respondents noting that when they felt that their ‘backs were 
against the wall’ it encouraged a desire to ‘fight back.’
‘It’s b … – you’re going to come in here and tell me what to do – that’s not your place.’ 
(NC)
3.1.5 Physical environment/system structure
Research identified a range of barriers to compliance related to the structure and practices 
of the CSA system itself. These centred around the perceived difficulty of interacting with the 
CSA to obtain information or adjust payment arrangements, and around the timing of the key 
contact points between paying parents and CSA staff.
Respondents frequently noted that they experienced the CSA as disorganised, and 
complained that they found it difficult to liaise with the CSA (via letter or via conversation 
with staff) to obtain needed information. For example, paying parents reported that when 
they had requested details about their case in the past – such as their recent payment 
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history, the status of Direct Debit arrangements, or specifics around how liability was 
calculated – staff had been unable to access the requested information. Instances of repeat 
letters and delays in registered changes in circumstances were reported. Respondents 
also voiced frustration about needing to repeat their circumstances on multiple occasions 
– feeling that when they tried to explain or respond to instances of non-compliance, these 
were not taken into account or followed through. Overall, frustrations around any perceived 
disorganisation reduced faith in CSA communications and contributed to a sense that the 
system was not as efficient as it could be.
‘Sometimes I receive the same letter 5 times – you wonder where does the money go? 
To our children, or wasted at the service they’re providing …’ 
(C)
Respondents also perceived the CSA system as highly inflexible – which was reported 
as sometimes making it difficult to pay, even when paying parents were willing to do so. 
This was in part linked to specific concerns around arranging payment within the context 
of variability in income due to self-employment. For example, some noted that they had 
not been able to easily switch between weekly and monthly payment to respond to shifting 
income variability, or the ability to ‘bank’ payments in advance rather than pay the same 
set amount for each payment. However, broader issues were also raised. For example, 
respondents perceived that paying parents could not easily adjust maintenance liability 
in response to variations in shared care responsibilities, to take into account periods 
of increased or primary care provision. Frustrations in this area were linked both to low 
understanding of the potential adjustments that could be made, as well as to some negative 
experiences of inflexibility on the part of case workers. 
‘I rang up and said I want to pay, can I pay X – they said no that’s not enough – and I 
thought F… you – I haven’t paid since.’ 
(NC)
Finally, the timing and focus of contact from CSA staff was perceived as unhelpful, and 
contributed to negative positioning of CSA as a system which primarily ‘chases payments’ 
rather than serving as a support service for parents to manage child maintenance. Some 
respondents noted that their first contact with the CSA had been notifications around arrears 
– for example, when backdating for a newly opened case resulted in an initial arrears 
notification of several thousands of pounds.12 When asked to describe their contact points 
with CSA, ‘hectoring phone calls’ were also respondents’ top of mind response; reminder 
calls from CSA staff, taking place after non-compliance had occurred, served as the ‘face of 
the CSA’ for most paying parents. Of necessity, these contacts centred around the negative 
event of having missed a payment. Respondents’ perception that the tone of these calls was 
quite negative, and that they felt ‘judged’ by staff, also meant that these calls often produced 
a desire to avoid contact with the CSA. 
‘First thing was a bill for thousands of pounds, that’s the first contact they gave me.’ 
(C)
12 Research could not establish the accuracy of these perceptions, and respondents’ 
recall of written contacts from CSA were overall quite low; it is possible that in some 
cases, earlier notifications and contacts had occurred, but that memories of arrears 
notification were more vivid. Regardless, these perceptions of arrears notifications as 
first contact did set the tone of their relationship with CSA for many respondents.
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3.1.6 Habits and Heuristics
Finally, a range of less conscious barriers were evident in terms of respondents’ habits and 
processes of automatic decision-making in relation to the CSA. As discussed previously, few 
respondents had developed good established practices around budgeting. This included 
individuals on lower incomes who felt they had not been able to move beyond more ‘reactive’ 
bill payment due to a lack of incoming cash flow, as well as individuals who were newly 
employed/self-employed who had not yet developed positive budgeting behaviours.
There was also evidence that some individuals had fallen into fixed habits of non-compliance 
– both for child maintenance payments specifically and for bill payment more generally. 
Particularly for those on lower incomes, there was an acceptance that not all bills were likely 
to be paid on time, and a feeling that more proactive approaches were either not feasible or 
worth it. This could result in paying parents’ using non-compliance contacts as ‘reminders’ to 
pay. This was linked to the limited perceive costs of non-compliance as discussed previously; 
respondents prioritised bills where there was higher perceived loss associated with non-
payment.
‘If I remember that’s fine, if I forget they ring up and harass me … So then you pay.’ 
(NC)
‘The consequences? I’m not really sure … I guess they can take you to court 
eventually?’ 
(NC)
Finally, there seemed to be a common influence of the availability of heuristics in terms 
of respondents’ priorities around how they would prefer to support their child – linked to 
previously discussed preferences for more in-person rather than arms-length provision 
of support. Respondents frequently mentioned that when paying through the CSA they 
‘can’t see where the money goes’ in the same way as when they provide tangible goods 
and activities to their children. Paying parents thus noted that when funds were tight, they 
preferred to spend money in person – for example, providing food, nappies, clothing, 
entertainment, and so on – during visitations. Research sessions could not establish 
the degree to which this provision of tangible support might ‘equal’ the financial amount 
calculated as respondents’ formal liability. In some cases, this seemed quite substantial; on 
others, there was some suggestion that respondents may be overestimating the financial 
value of tangible supports provided, as these were more emotionally salient.
‘I don’t see where the money is going to – it’s just another bill coming out of my 
account. Whereas if I have the opportunity to take care of my children, that obviously 
makes me feel better – I can see where the money is going.’ 
(C)
3.2 Triggers for compliance 
Overall, compliance seemed to be a shifting status for many in the research sample. Many 
of the currently compliant individuals included in research had been non-compliant at some 
point in the past, and there were suggestions that some were actually non-compliant at point 
of interview – but that this had not yet been registered in the child maintenance system. Few, 
if any, experienced none of the barriers identified above; for example, compliant parents 
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often raised similar concerns around legitimacy and beliefs about being unfairly ‘judged’ by 
CSA. However, overall they tended to experience fewer of these barriers and to a lesser 
degree – and, in some cases, to have key behavioural triggers for compliance which were 
not observed in other respondents.
The key drivers for compliance which seemed to be most successful in overriding the range 
of attitudinal and practical barriers discussed above are summarised as follows:
Figure 3.2 Triggers for compliance under CSA
Firstly, within the research sample, compliant clients were more likely to have higher or more 
stable incomes overall.13 This basic differentiator played a key role across multiple behaviour 
drivers, including efficacy, habit, and costs and benefits. For example, relatively higher and 
less variable incomes: 
• tended to mean that respondents felt fundamentally able to pay both their basic living 
costs as well as monthly bills, including child maintenance. 
13 Anecdotally, recruitment of compliant respondents working 16 or fewer hours per week 
was very difficult – and limited representation of this group within the sample provided 
meant that more depth interviews and paired depths or trios were undertaken with this 
group rather than an originally intended focus group approach. In contrast, a focus 
group of compliant individuals working 16+ hours or more per week was recruited with 
ease.
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Even if I have my doubts, 
I’ve got to do the right 
thing…
I budget for it like 
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used to it
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I don’t have to think 
about it
Don’t want to be the ‘non-
paying Dad’
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be…
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Debt and harassing 
phone calls are too 
stressful
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‘If you can pay and don’t pay, your moral compass is skewed.’ 
(C)
• were associated with the development of budgeting skills and habits which allowed 
respondents to be more proactive about putting money aside for maintenance payments 
and to plan ahead for any potential dips in income.
• enabled the use of budgeting tools such as Direct Debit. This was a strong driver of 
compliance – effectively removing the monthly ‘choice’ to pay maintenance, and thus 
mitigating the impact of any existing barriers around payment. 
• tended to have less normalisation of debt – which seemed to amplify the impact of any 
notifications from CSA around arrears or non-payment. For example, those who had not 
previously experienced frequent debt found phone calls from CSA staff to be much more 
stressful, and preferred to avoid them.
‘I don’t like things hanging over my back – the longer you leave it the worse it’s going to 
get. I like to stay on top of things.’ 
(C) 
Other drivers for compliance were more attitudinal, based on respondents’ personal 
priorities and identity considerations. For example, a few individuals reported that they 
felt a strong moral obligation to support their children, in part linked to fear of being viewed 
as a ‘deadbeat Dad’, or a ‘non-paying father.’ In one case, this basic driver overcame 
significant barriers around the perceived legitimacy of payment; the paying parent had 
doubts that the funds provided were being spent appropriately, but nonetheless wanted to 
be able to have a clean conscience that he had ‘done his part.’ Others had strong personal 
orientations that one should avoid debt and non-payment – seemingly in part linked to social 
norms within his family and peer group about appropriate behaviour.
‘As a parent of my children I have a moral responsibility to support them.’ 
(C)
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4 Child Maintenance System 
– self-employed paying 
parents’ responses and likely 
behaviour
After providing a brief overview of the key aspects of the new Child Maintenance System 
(CMS), this chapter:
• summarises the key windows of opportunity and potential risks around positive behaviour 
change within the CMS – drawing on the range of triggers and barriers for compliance as 
outlined in the previous chapter; 
• explores self-employed paying parents’ responses to key aspects of the new CMS; 
• details current experiences of self-employed paying parents who have already interacted 
with the CMS; and 
• discusses potential communications and other support which may help promote positive 
behaviour change as the new system is rolled out.
4.1 Summary of levers in the new Child 
Maintenance System
During research sessions (which took place before charging was put in place), a summary of 
the new CMS was introduced to respondents, including the following four key aspects:
1 Under the Government’s proposals, the CMS will charge a £20 application fee;
2 There will be a 20 per cent collection charge for paying parents on top of their 
calculation;
3 There will be a four per cent charge on payments for receiving parents; 
4 These ongoing charges can be avoided if parents opt for Direct Pay, where parents pay 
each-other directly at arms-length from the CMS. If payments stop, the CMS will step in 
and enforce payments, where they are informed;  
5 Maintenance liability will be calculated based on Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs 
(HMRC) figures from the last full tax year. Unless income changes by more than 25 per 
cent HMRC will not reflect any change in income in their liability until the next annual 
review. 
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4.2 Windows of opportunity and potential risks
As part of the analysis process, researchers mapped out the potential windows of 
opportunity and risk areas for the new CMS. Using the map of behavioural drivers, we 
identified likely points of intersection between the range of barriers to compliance (explored 
in Section 3.1) and the key levers for change in the new system (primarily around the 
introduction of charges).
These are summarised in the figures below in the rectangles. 
Figure 4.1 Windows of opportunity for CMS in overcoming compliance barriers
As outlined above, the key windows of opportunity for the introduction of charging in terms of 
promoting positive behaviour change are around disrupting perceptions that non-compliance 
is ‘low cost’ by providing more motivation around loss aversion (i.e., via introducing a direct 
cost for non-compliance such as enforcement charges, or other consequences that are 
clearly linked to non-compliant behaviour) – potentially disrupting patterns of habitual non-
payment and passivity around proactive budgeting.
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Efficacy
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Habit
Heuristics
Physical 
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Reduced access – less moral pull 
‘Wrong’ to monetise relationship 
with child 
Child’s welfare does not depend 
on CSA 
Feel victimised and judged
Becomes the norm not to 
pay on time
If new to self-employment, 
no planning systems in 
place
Available bias (Cant’ 
‘see’ where the money 
goes; overestimate in-
person payments?)
 No real ‘loss aversion’
CSA viewed as 
disorganised, hard to 
work with 
Lack of flexibility
Timing of contract
CSA is out to get Dads
You don’t own me/I just don’t 
care!
Normal to be in debt/arrears – 
everyone is struggling financially
Liability is unfair/
incorrect
Payments don’t benefit 
my child – they benefits 
ex-partner/government
Limited income – can I 
pay my bills?
Running out of cash is 
inevitable
Better to be in debt with 
CSA than miss rent/affect 
my credit rating
It’s not worth dipping 
into credit cards and 
overdraft…
Nothing really 
happens…
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The introduction of application fees also went some way to redress feelings that the CSA 
treats fathers unfairly, or does not hold both parents accountable for working together to 
agree the best solutions for arranging child support. Finally, there was some sense that 
calculating maintenance liability from the full tax year might result in fairer calculation of 
liability for self-employed individuals – although there was low understanding of how this 
might work as compared to the current calculation approach.
However, the introduction of charges also involves some risks in terms of amplifying existing 
barriers around child maintenance payment, which must be addressed in order to promote 
positive behaviour change. These are summarised in Figure 4.2 (in the rectangles) as 
follows.
Figure 4.2 Potential risks around the introduction of charging via CMS 
Detailed audience responses, and insight on likely behaviour to key aspects of the new 
system are explored in Section 4.3 below.
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4.3 Detailed responses to CMS
This chapter explores respondents’ understanding of and response to key aspects of the 
CMS system, likely windows of opportunity and potential risks in terms of responding to the 
key barriers to compliance under CSA, and initial experiences of CMS thus far.
4.3.1 £20 application fee
Perhaps unsurprisingly, paying parents were largely positive about the introduction of the 
£20 upfront application fee for individuals who wanted to open a statutory maintenance case. 
For some, this concept produced a visible emotional response; respondents felt that an 
application fee went some way to redressing the perceived power imbalance between 
receiving and paying parents. They noted that application fees might help reduce (perceived) 
‘spiteful’ claims, partially addressing legitimacy concerns that maintenance cases were 
opened not for the benefit of the child in question, but as a way to ‘punish’ the paying parent. 
And, crucially, many hoped that the introduction of fees would prompt new consideration of 
and conversations around potential alternative arrangements – motivating ex-partners to 
consider Direct Pay or family-based arrangements.
‘I don’t think it would be worth it for her to pay £20 just p.. me off …’ 
(NC)
However, respondents also expressed some doubt that the £20 application fee would be 
sufficient to achieve the above outcomes. For example, some mentioned that relationships 
with ex-partners were so poor that they felt that ex-partners would still be willing to pay the 
fee rather than open a conversation about alternatives, and that the amount was also not 
sufficient to dissuade less ‘well intentioned’ applications. 
‘It’s not a lot – it’s nowt really.’ 
(C) 
Additionally, a minority of respondents raised more general concerns that the application fee 
may inappropriately dissuade some parents from opening a statutory child maintenance case 
where this was useful and needed. For example, one respondent noted that he would worry 
that a mother who did not have the money to pay might thus be prevented from opening a 
statutory case where there was a ‘legitimate’ need for one.
4.3.2 Collection charges
The idea of collection charges, as introduced under the CMS policy changes, also resulted 
in a strong emotional response from paying parents in this research. There were clear 
impacts in terms of collection charges amplifying existing unhelpful perceptions of the 
child maintenance system as lacking legitimacy. Respondents were quick to declare this 
as additional proof that the system is set up to ‘penalise fathers’, and reported that this 
would contribute to a feeling that the CMS would ‘benefit the Government’ rather than the 
child in question. There thus seemed to be some risk that charges may further intensify the 
perceived disconnect between payment and ‘the good of the child’ – reducing what should 
be a key moral driver for compliant payment.
‘This is just extra revenue from the Government, coming from the working classes.’ 
(C)
40
Attitudes and behaviours of self-employed child maintenance clients and barriers to 
paying child maintenance
Likewise, there were initial reactions suggesting that the introduction of charges might 
exacerbate feelings that a focus on financial support due raises associations with 
inappropriate or ‘immoral’ intervention. At the point of discussion at which the idea of charges 
were introduced, respondents often repeated earlier assertions that the system did not 
take into account their desires or actual behaviour around supporting their children in other 
ways. Some reported that, for them, charges would send the message that ‘making’ fathers 
contribute financially was the only thing that mattered to the CMS – as opposed to, for 
example, encouraging parents to work together collaboratively to support their children in the 
best way possible. 
This raised strong feelings of anger and frustration for many – as well as, for many 
respondents, feelings that they should ‘fight back’ against what they perceived as unjust 
‘punishment’ or controls around child maintenance. As discussed in Section 2.2, many 
parents reported that they would prefer to be more directly involved in their children’s lives, 
but did not feel this was currently feasible due to existing tensions and difficulties around 
communications with the receiving parent. For example, some non-compliant individuals 
with existing barriers around the legitimacy and morality of the CSA system declared that 
under CMS they ‘simply wouldn’t pay.’ Worryingly, this kind of reaction was evidence in some 
currently compliant respondents as well. 
‘If I saw this, that’s it – I’m not going to pay.’ 
(NC)
‘All of these penalty charges are just going to make people even more unable to make 
a private arrangement – they’ll be too angry.’ 
(NC)
Respondents expressed a strong desire to avoid collection charges, and in theory viewed 
them as an incentive for parents to move out of the statutory system. Those in amicable 
relationships with their ex-partners were generally supportive of this change and felt it 
would be effective in moving themselves and others into private arrangements, or to use 
Direct Pay. However, many respondents contended that their difficult relationship with their 
ex-partner would prevent them from leaving the statutory system or paying via Direct Pay, 
despite being willing to do so. It was expected that in practice it would be extremely difficult 
for them to set up a productive dialogue with their ex-partner without mediation or external 
support, let alone set up and maintain private arrangements. Those who reported particularly 
negative relationships felt that collection charges would simply represent another ‘weapon in 
the arsenal’ for their ex-partner, further enabling them to use the statutory system to ‘punish’ 
fathers following tumultuous relationship breakdowns.
‘Direct Pay won’t work with me – she’ll do it just to cripple me’ 
(NC)
This in turn accentuated feelings of frustration and disempowerment, as these respondents 
felt they would be completely unable to avoid collection charges. It also raised anxieties 
amongst those who were already struggling to afford their child maintenance payments, 
expecting the additional charges would exacerbate their financial worries and make their 
child maintenance payments unmanageable. Whilst these respondents often became 
despondent during these discussions, other respondents (including the compliant) 
reacted more angrily. Again the desire to ‘fight back’ was reiterated, as parents rejected 
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the legitimacy of payments and reported they would try to ‘game the system’ as a result. 
Respondents began to brainstorm ideas of how they could reduce their liability calculation as 
much as possible, by either reducing their hours worked or decreasing their taxable income 
by various methods. Others suggested they would consider under-declaring their income or 
becoming unemployed, as they would feel disincentivised to earn money. Collection charges 
posed several risks in terms of respondent’s feelings towards the system, that it would be 
punitive towards fathers and ‘force’ them to pay extra to fund a government agency, and 
ultimately for some raised the risk of proactive non-compliance.
‘This will be the straw that breaks the camel’s back – I’m already living on credit, I’ll 
have to go on benefits if they do this.’ 
(NC)
‘I would be angry – and I would reduce my income.’ 
(NC)
4.3.3 Enforcement charges
Charges were viewed by some as an appropriate and reasonable lever to promote on-time 
payment for those that chose to open a statutory maintenance case. Within the context of 
alternative options such as Direct Pay, there was a sense that those that chose to use the 
statutory system should then meet its terms.
‘Fine. if you’ve made the choice to be in the statutory system, you should pay!’ 
(NC)
Additionally, for those with the means to pay, there was evidence that enforcement charges 
could disrupt habitual patterns of non-compliance and encourage greater prioritisation of 
child maintenance payments when ‘juggling’ this against other bills.
However, the introduction of the concept of enforcement charges also seemed to amplify 
barriers in relation to respondents’ existing concerns around the legitimacy and morality of 
the child maintenance system and maintenance payments. Respondents raised a variety of 
concerns about whether these charges would be levied in situations where they perceived 
that parents might have ‘legitimate’ reasons not to pay, or to fail to pay on time. These were 
considered particularly problematic for self-employed paying parents, who both had more 
variable income and had less income protection in cases of unexpected sickness or inability 
to work. Some respondents also raised concerns that if funds were unexpectedly taken out 
of their account there was so little ‘cushion’ in their financial circumstances that this could 
have knock-on effects in terms of their ability to stay afloat financially.
‘If Mister X has zero pounds in his account, what’s the point of penalising him?’ 
(C)
‘If you’re on the sick and you can’t afford to pay … there’s got to be some common 
sense.’ 
(NC) 
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Respondents reacted with fear and anger at the prospect that enforcement charges would be 
applied in what they deemed as ‘unfair’ circumstances. There was an assumption that under 
the CMS, relevant circumstances affecting payment would need to be taken into account, 
and that there would need to be clear avenues of influence for paying parents to interact with 
the system to adjust liability and payment appropriately. In the potential absence of this kind 
of flexible adjustment to how enforcement charges were applied, there were suggestions that 
enforcement charges could further amplify barriers around legitimacy.
4.3.4 Liability calculation
Paying parents generally viewed the changes to the liability calculation – with information 
coming directly from HMRC, and liability being based on a full year’s income – as a small 
benefit. Only a minority experienced the current system of calculating and declaring their 
income to be a slight burden – e.g., if running their own business. The increased speed of 
calculation was also not viewed as a strong benefit. 
However, this response was in the context of a very low awareness of how liability was 
currently calculated, and respondents found it difficult to respond to information about 
changes in calculation. Likewise, there was some suggestion that current declarations of 
income might be approximated or not currently match up with HMRC data. For example, 
those individuals who had misappropriately identified themselves as ‘self-employed’ at 
the point of entering the statutory system had not actually themselves registered as self-
employed with HMRC or submitted the corresponding annual returns. To the degree that 
direct linkages with HMRC data would enable the identification of inappropriately categorised 
parents, however, this could have significant impact on some paying parents.
Respondents also raised the issue that the CMS adjustment to the way that liability is 
calculated did not address their current concerns under the Child Support Agency (CSA). 
For example, they noted that a system based on a 12-month calculation does not obviously 
respond to the flux and variability in income which characterises self-employment, and 
expected that there still may be some mismatch between what one was able to pay a year 
ago and what was feasible at present. There were also concerns that this system would 
not take into account sickness or periods of unemployment, and questions around how 
this would be reflected in liability calculations. Some respondents also mentioned that a 
25 per cent difference in income (the minimum difference required to trigger an automatic 
recalculation of liability) was quite high; for example, particularly for those on low income, 
a 20 per cent drop in earnings could make the difference between having to focus only on 
‘survival’ costs and being able to pay other bills above and beyond this. 
‘It’s not better, it’s still based on your previous year’s earnings – it needs to be 
calculated every 3-6 months not every 12.’
(C)
‘You might have a bad year but you’d still have to pay a high rate, it might cause 
businesses to shut down; it’s based on assumption and probability, it’s like gamble, like 
throwing a dice and expecting to get six, you might not get a six but will be charged for 
it.’’ 
(C)
43
Attitudes and behaviours of self-employed child maintenance clients and barriers to 
paying child maintenance
4.4 Experiences of the CMS thus far
As noted previously, the transition to the CMS from the current CSA system had only recently 
begun when this research was undertaken; as a result, some of the individuals indicated as 
being registered within the CMS system within the DWP child maintenance database actually 
had limited experience with the system at point of interview. The following findings are drawn 
from relatively few interviews, and there may be aspects of users’ experience under early 
implementation of CMS that are not captured here. 
There were some initial reports of positive experiences under the new system – particularly 
centring around staff communication and treatment. For example, several respondents 
mentioned that they had found CMS staff to be helpful and constructive in their verbal 
interactions with them, creating a positive experience at the point of interaction with the 
system, and contributing to positive impressions of CMS overall. Positive experiences with 
case workers seemed to reduce the feelings of victimisation and resentment towards the 
system so commonplace for respondents under the CSA – and did not raise the same kind 
of ‘knee jerk’ impulse not to comply or sort out payment solutions. One respondent noted that 
he had been pleasantly surprised with the experience overall, making a direct comparison 
with the overall negative reputation of the CSA.
‘I’ve heard horror stories about the CSA, they’re like the police aren’t they?’ 
(C)
Likewise, although there was some evidence of delays in respondents’ cases becoming 
‘active’ in the new system – for example, where the transition from CSA to CMS took longer 
than expected, or there were delays between a case being opened and payment actually 
being required – frustration about this had been countered by proactive, positive and clear 
communications from CMS staff. For example, one respondent noted that he appreciated 
being ‘kept in the loop’ at a stressful time. Another noted that a CMS staff member had 
clearly explained the Service’s rationale behind encouraging private arrangements, and how 
the various charges under the CMS worked.
‘They told me how much I needed to pay right away, but I needed it in writing, and that 
took months … it was very stressful but they handled it very well … they’ve been very 
fair and kind and great and non-judgemental.’’
(C)
Despite some evidence of very clear communications, as discussed above, other 
respondents had very low awareness of being in a ‘new’ system and the implications of 
this – both for those who had only recently opened a statutory case within the CMS, as well 
as those who had recently been transitioned over from existing CSA-based arrangements. 
Some newly registered individuals could not recall any contact to date (either from the CSA 
or the CMS). CMS-registered respondents tended not to be aware, for example, of the range 
of charges that had been introduced or what this might mean for them personally. Most were 
also not aware of alternatives to statutory arrangements, such as Direct Pay; no respondents 
in the sample were able to provide a summary of how Direct Pay worked. 
44
Attitudes and behaviours of self-employed child maintenance clients and barriers to 
paying child maintenance
This research was not in a position to identify to what degree this was due to information 
not having been provided, and to what degree it was due to paying parents not taking notice 
of or understanding CSA communications. There were some reports of letters not arriving, 
of finding the explanations provided difficult to understand, or of receiving ‘duplicate’ letters 
rather than case updates. 
‘Why not say we’re making these changes, here they are … it’s a one page letter that 
says they’ll be doing something, but doesn’t say exactly what.’
(C)
However, there were also some indications that some respondents – particularly those 
with prior experience of the CSA – may have taken little notice of letters provided, relying 
instead on staff phone calls as their key contact point in the system. In some cases, it is 
possible that communications had been received, but had been disregarded, particularly if 
they did not clearly signal that they were ‘new’ or ‘different’ (e.g., via clearly differentiated 
branding or formatting).
Where respondents were aware of the key aspects of the CMS system, there was also some 
evidence that the introduction of charging in the new system was exacerbating existing 
barriers and negative orientation towards maintenance payments. This centred around 
frustrations from parents who would have preferred to arrange alternative arrangements 
(either family-based arrangements or Direct Pay), but did not feel able to do so as their ex-
partners had not agreed. This could amplify barriers discussed in Section 3. 1 around the 
legitimacy and morality of the maintenance system, and make paying parents feel they were 
being unfairly treated or victimised. For these parents, the key ‘experience’ of the CMS was a 
perception that they were being ‘punished’ for something that was out of their control. Within 
the small CMS sample (with experience of the system) included in this research, it was not 
possible to draw direct links between these attitudes and behaviour around compliance. 
However, it does raise concerns about potential risks of amplification of barriers and non-
compliant response for some paying parents.
‘There’s no support for the man, not at all … no justice.’ 
(C)
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5 Communication and support 
needs
Once respondents had been introduced to the aspects of the Child Maintenance Service 
(CMS) system and initial understanding and reactions had been identified, research sessions 
also explored paying parents’ potential communication and support needs in relation to the 
CMS. 
Principally, respondents were keen to understand more about the practical steps required to 
set up alternative arrangements to statutory child maintenance cases, both via family-based 
arrangements and Direct Pay. As noted previously, most respondents were already keen to 
avoid government involvement in ‘private’ matters where this wasn’t necessary – even under 
the current CSA system – and the introduction of charges under the CMS only enhanced 
this. Many noted that the introduction of the CMS may be a good opportunity for a ‘fresh 
start,’ and thus a reconsideration of the best maintenance arrangement for their child. 
‘It will be good for people that have been in the system for a while to have to start over 
… have the conversation again … it’s a new system …’ 
(NC) 
In order to support decision making, respondents thus indicated that they required clear 
communications and guidance on the options available – as well as any available 
support to help them achieve non-statutory arrangements. This was particularly relevant 
around the potential to set up Direct Pay arrangements; respondents wanted to know 
what information would need to be provided in practice, and whether and what kind of 
information would be provided to ex-partners to encourage them to consider this option. 
Many expressed strong concerns that these would not be achievable without Government 
or third-party assistance – often indicating interest in the help of a liaison officer, mediator, 
or other independent party to help them open up conversations with their ex-partners and 
help set up new arrangements. If this was not possible, they were eager for advice about 
other third-party solutions; for example, about the potential to hold conversations regarding 
arrangements via a trusted family member or relative, or even to pay child maintenance to 
this individual rather than the other parent.
‘I wouldn’t want to have the conversation with my ex – she’s too bitter – but if no 
contact was needed, great.’ 
(NC)
‘We just really need mediation so the parents can communicate …’ 
(C)
Research also explored potential responses around shifting the timing of communications 
under the CMS, to help reposition the CMS as ‘supporting’ rather than ‘punishing parents.’ 
Respondents were asked how they might respond if the CMS provided proactive 
reminders around payments due, rather than primarily focusing contact with parents around 
communications about missed payments or money owed, after the fact. As per the behaviour 
barriers outlined above, this might also provide an opportunity to help inspire action due to 
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instincts for loss aversion.
Overall, paying parents welcomed more proactive reminders within the context of potential 
penalties and charges under the CMS (e.g., either collection charges, due to being placed 
within the statutory system after any missed payments, or enforcement charges). However, 
some raised the issue that this should include some practical boundaries around contact. 
For example, some respondents raised requests for targeting, so that those who had Direct 
Debit payments or had been historically compliant would not receive notices. Respondents 
had mixed channel preferences for these kinds of reminders overall, but tended not to think 
that reminders should take letter form – and the clear problems around engagement with 
these currently supports that this may not be the best channel to use. The potential for text 
or email reminders was raised spontaneously as a good way to reach parents without being 
intrusive.
Respondents also mentioned that they would welcome a more positive, empathetic tone in 
communications from the CMS as the new system rolls out – particularly from CMS staff. 
Paying parents raised that being ‘treated well’ would reduce their aversion to making contact 
with the child maintenance system, and their ‘knee jerk’ negative responses. Working 
to ensure that the more positive tone that seems to have been used so far by CMS staff 
continues is likely to be beneficial in terms of helping reduce emotional reactions anger and 
rejection which often seem to underpin non-compliance under the Child Support Agency 
(CSA). Exploring a more positive tone in written communications may also be beneficial – 
as would potentially providing differentiation in branding to mark a clean ‘break’ with the old 
system.
‘The communications need to be encouraging – so that you are happy to communicate, 
not terrified to open it.’ 
(C) 
‘Cut parents a bit of slack – find out a bit more before coming down on them.’ 
(NC)
Finally, respondents also stressed that they were eager for more recognition that parenting 
and child maintenance is a shared responsibility, and welcomed any communications from 
the new CMS system which acknowledged this. For example, they were eager to hear about 
any efforts that the CMS would undertake to encourage the receiving parent to consider 
alternative arrangements, so that they would feel this task wasn’t solely ‘up to them.’ As 
above, a tone of ‘shared’ responsibility may help reduce the anger and resistance evidenced 
under the CSA, counteracting existing narratives of victimisation and a sense that the CSA 
‘punishes fathers.’
5.1 Conclusions
Understanding ‘self-employment’
• Although ‘self-employment’ is officially defined by Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs 
(HMRC) rules, paying parents self-categorise their employment status for child 
maintenance purposes. This research indicates that this has led to some miscategorisation 
of individuals within the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) child maintenance 
database. This seems to include some individuals who have misunderstood their 
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employment status (e.g., because they are on zero-hours contracts) as well as some 
individuals who are essentially unemployed (but identify as ‘self-employed’ to capture 
minimal income they do earn outside of a formal work context).
• For individuals who are essentially unemployed or have only limited self-employment, lack 
of adequate income flow is a significant barrier to compliance. Some respondents noted 
that they struggled to pay basic living expenses; others noted that they ‘juggled’ payments 
and bills, but were typically unable to manage to pay all on time every month. Whilst cash 
flow management was an issue across the self-employed audience due to increased 
variability and unpredictability of income, those on very low salaries reported that they 
simply did not feel able to pay.
• There was also some limited evidence of more ‘strategic’ self-employment, with individuals 
preferring to remain self-employed to ‘block’ the statutory system from being able to take 
maintenance payments directly out of their wages. Whilst this was only minimally observed 
in the sample, it does suggest that at least some individuals in the self-employed audience 
are inherently predisposed not to comply.
Journey to use of the statutory system
• Respondents spoke of family relationships (i.e., with ex-partners) as fraught with conflict 
and turmoil. Communications were typically very problematic or had broken down 
completely; many respondents had no contact whatsoever with their ex-partner, and often 
had not done so for many years. This conflict and communication difficulty was felt to be a 
fundamental driver for the need for statutory services, and due to their entrenched nature, 
respondents often felt it difficult or impossible to make alternative arrangements.
• When describing their reasons for use of the statutory system, respondents also raised 
a range of relationship-based issues which underpinned their attitudes towards child 
maintenance and motivation to comply. For example, statutory cases were often opened 
due to concerns that maintenance supports were not being used appropriately (e.g., due 
to suspected substance issues or ‘selfish’ uses of funds by receiving parents), or were not 
needed (due to imbalances in earnings between parents). 
• Where opened by receiving parents, cases were often a result of existing disputes about 
payment amounts or frequency. However, respondents also often felt that statutory cases 
were opened ‘strategically’ by ex-partners, for example, used as a ‘threat’ during times 
of conflict, or as a ‘punishment’ following disagreements. This was tied to a perceived 
negative reputation of the CSA as something that was ‘punishing’ and should be feared by 
fathers.
• However, there was also more minimal evidence of some respondents having entered the 
statutory system ‘by default’ – e.g., assuming that this was the ‘normal way’ to arrange for 
child maintenance after separation. This group may be the most open to discussions about 
alternative arrangements (e.g., Direct Pay or family-based arrangements) under the CMS.
Drivers of non-compliance under the CSA
• Respondents evidenced a wide range of behavioural, attitudinal and practical barriers 
around compliant payment of child maintenance under the CSA. Many of these were 
specifically related to issues of income and self-employment, but typically these were less 
top of mind and seemingly less influential than other issues. In consequence, research 
mapped out the full range of barriers raised in discussions to understand the full context of 
drivers of behaviour around payment.
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• Efficacy issues were frequently raised as key barriers, particularly for those on lower 
incomes. As noted above, many expressed frustration and anxiety around being able to 
pay their basic living expenses; others found that they had to prioritise payment of certain 
bills over others. This was related to issues around perceived costs and benefits of non-
payment; there was some evidence that child maintenance payments were prioritised less 
than other bills and expenses due to perceived limited ‘costs’ of non-compliance under the 
CSA system. Variability in budgeting behaviour, and often quite low budgeting ability due to 
both lack of funds and lack of experience in money management, also contributed to non-
compliance for many. 
• Key to non-compliance were issues around the perceived legitimacy of the CSA and 
of the child maintenance system, with respondents raising a range of barriers around 
believing that payment was actually ‘the right thing to do.’ Many felt the liability payments 
calculations were unfair, not adequately taking into account problems around income flow 
(either due to self-employment or low income), support provided outside the statutory 
system, their ex-partner’s financial situation, and other financial pressures. There were 
also reported errors with the system, and a perceived inability to work with CSA staff 
to amend these – tied to feelings of inflexibility of the system structure and of staff 
themselves. Overall, these barriers could unhelpfully reduce respondents’ perceived link 
between ‘paying maintenance’ and ‘supporting my child.’ 
• Issues around morality and social or cultural norms also supported non-compliant 
behaviour for many. Respondents tended to perceive the statutory system as a 
‘punishment’ rather than a support, and often felt that they were treated unfairly by the 
system and staff. They reported a sense that they were assumed to be ‘at fault’ rather 
than part of a parenting partnership, and were frustrated that they were ‘forced’ into 
paying, rather than given the opportunity to be more involved with their children. This 
could result in anger at being treated ‘like a criminal’ that resulted in defensiveness and 
anger – and often, less willingness to pay. For some, this linked to wider cultural norms 
around believing that the Government more widely treated them unfairly, and that it was 
thus legitimate to ‘fight back’ with non-compliance. Parents also felt it inappropriate for 
the emphasis in support to be placed on arms-length financial support rather than more 
embedded care, which they also found more satisfying. Furthermore, normalisation of debt 
supported non-compliant behaviour for many.
• Finally, perceptions of the CSA as disorganised and inflexible further reduced respondents’ 
willingness to comply. For example, respondents noted delays in registering change of 
circumstances, the need to repeat details over and over, and instances of repeat letters. 
This could lead to a sense that it was not useful to try to engage with the system, and 
reduced motivation to sort out payment solutions. Perceived ‘harassing’ case worker tone 
and the timing of CSA contact – usually after non-payment, so positioned as punishing 
rather than helpful – further demotivated compliance.
CMS – responses and likely behaviour
• The key windows of opportunity around the CMS seem to centre around the ability of 
charges to combat a sense of limited cost of non-compliance, inspiring more loss aversion 
via the desire to avoid collection or enforcement charges. This may help disrupt current 
habits of non-compliance and result in greater prioritisation of child maintenance for those 
that can afford to pay.
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• Respondents were keen to avoid charges under the CMS, and felt that the introduction 
of charges might inspire new conversations about sorting out alternative arrangements. 
These were typically welcomed, although many expressed concerns that family-based 
or Direct Pay arrangements would not be feasible without significant support due to poor 
communication and contact with ex-partners. 
• Paying parents thus worried that they would be ‘forced’ into the statutory system by 
circumstance despite their own interest in other arrangements – which could raise 
significant frustration and anger, as well as amplifying existing barriers to compliance 
around the perceived legitimacy and morality of the child maintenance system. Many felt 
that charges would only exacerbate their current sense of being unfairly ‘punished,’ and 
raised real concerns about their ability to pay. Worryingly, anger and frustration about 
this led some to state that the introduction of charges would lead to outright rejection 
of payment. Others suggested that they would look to ‘game the system’ (e.g., by 
misdeclaring their income) in order to reduce their liability.
• Respondents were also fairly positive toward the idea of an application fee, which they 
felt might reduce the number of ‘unjust’ statutory cases borne of ‘punishment’ rather than 
need. However, the application fee was not felt to be sufficient to deter many. 
Experiences of CMS thus far
• Understanding and direct experience of the CMS was fairly limited within the research 
sample. Many of those transitioning from CSA to CMS were not aware that they had been 
moved into a ‘new’ system or what was different about this, and most of those with new 
cases had only limited contact, if any, with the system thus far. Research was unable to 
evidence to what extent communication had not yet occurred with these individuals versus 
communication having happened but not engaged with.
• Within the limited sample of those who had interacted with the CMS, there were some 
positive reports around communications and interactions thus far. This included a sense 
that CMS staff had adopted a helpful, encouraging and positive tone in interactions – 
leading to much more positive views of the system, and an increased willingness to sort 
out payment solutions. There was also some evidence of proactive communications to 
clearly outline what the upcoming changes were including the introduction of charges, 
which was appreciated by those who had received such communication.
• However, there were also some reports of unclear communications or letters not arriving 
when expected. For example, letters, which explained the changes in the system, being 
difficult to understand. Some who were aware they were in the new system did not 
understand that collection and enforcement charges had been introduced, or that they 
were being encouraged to consider alternative maintenance arrangements.
• There was also evidence that for some, charges under the CMS was exacerbating existing 
resentment of the statutory system. Some respondents were angry and felt disempowered 
about being ‘forced’ into a statutory system which had increased payments despite being 
interested in sorting out alternative arrangements – feeling unable to do so because of 
relationship-based issues and communication difficulties with ex-partners. Although there 
was no evidence that this had increased non-compliance, this would seem to be a risk 
given the evidenced rejection of the CSA under similar circumstances.
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5.2 Recommendations
• Further internal investigation and research on DWP’s ‘self-employed’ sample is required, 
in part to understand whether there is higher representation of low-income and/or 
unemployed individuals in this group than the wider audience of paying parents. As income 
was a key driver of non-compliance for some, it is possible that non-compliance amongst 
the self-employed audience may be partially explained by income. 
• Paying parents were typically keen to sort out alternative arrangements (e.g., Direct Pay 
or family-based arrangements). However, they will need clear guidance on how to do this 
– likely via both written communications and verbal communications, given the current 
reliance on discussions with staff. In particular, this needs to include explicit guidance on 
how to arrange non-statutory agreements when communication with ex-partners is poor 
– either via mediation or liaison services, or via family members and other third parties. 
Ideally, paying parents are eager for face-to-face support to help set up arrangements. 
They would also welcome any information about how receiving partners are being 
encouraged by the system to consider other options; this may also help reduce barriers 
around perceptions of being unfairly targeted or ‘punished’.
• There is currently a lack of understanding of how liability is calculated, and how paying 
parents can work with the system where there are perceived errors, income flow issues, or 
other needed adjustments. Clear communications around this (written and verbal) will help 
to reduce barriers around legitimacy of payments. This will need to be supported, however, 
with adequate follow-through to help build parents’ confidence that they can work with the 
system successfully.
• Support and education on budgeting ability would be beneficial. This may be particularly 
useful for newly employed or self-employed individuals who are beginning to form 
budgeting habits. However, given evidence of limited budgeting ability for many in this 
research sample, budgeting advice may benefit the audience more widely. Tailoring of 
information for those on lower incomes would be useful given more difficulty in meeting 
payments obligations in this audience.
• Given suggestions that early letters from the CMS might have been disregarded or 
not recognised as ‘new’, communications may benefit from branding which clearly 
differentiates it from the CSA. This will help to signal to individuals transitioning from the 
CSA that they have entered a ‘new’ system, and may also help support helpful positioning 
of the CMS as a ‘fresh start’.
• CMS communications would strongly benefit from continuing what seems to be a shift 
in tone; initial indication would suggest that this is successful in helping to build a more 
positive reputation than that of the CSA, and to encourage more collaborative and positive 
responses from paying parents. The tone and perceived flexibility of CMS staff will be 
critical. Under the CSA, staff are very much the ‘face’ of the system for paying parents, and 
tone taken in verbal interactions seems to be much more influential than that of letters. 
Likewise, proactive reminders might help re-position the statutory system as ‘helpful’ rather 
than ‘punishing’ – whilst also capitalising on loss aversion instincts to promote on-time 
payment.
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• As above, any emphasis on the need for ‘parents to work together’ will help shift 
perceptions that the child maintenance system unfairly targets fathers. It may be beneficial 
for communications to focus more on ‘supporting children’ rather than ‘meeting obligations’ 
– emphasising the link between payment and child welfare rather than payment to meet 
the terms of ‘government’ requirements. However, this will need to be supported by action 
to be perceived as credible in the long term – e.g., via active encouragement of receiving 
parents to consider family-based and Direct Pay options, and via encouragement of more 
direct parental involvement rather than arms-length payment. Concerns about how child 
maintenance funds are spent may also continue to present real barriers unless paying 
parents perceive that they have avenues for these concerns to be taken into account.
• Clear communications will also be required about the consequences of non-compliance in 
terms of late or absent payment – ideally, backed up by immediate feedback when non-
compliance has occurred. The CMS will need to counter a sense that the statutory system 
is disorganised and unpredictable, and help to encourage more consistent payment 
behaviour via more consistent action when non-payment has occurred (e.g. in the case of 
the CMS collection service, an immediate letter or phone call). However, this will need to 
be managed sensitively; paying parents are likely to respond highly negatively if the CMS 
is perceived as applying penalties inappropriately, and will be eager for ‘grace periods’ and 
other recognition by the system that there can be legitimate difficulties in payment. Again 
in the case of the CMS collection service, the use of more proactive reminders – prior 
to payment deadlines rather than after payment has been missed – may also promote 
compliance.
• There may also be an opportunity to adjust social norms around debt and non-payment 
– both by helping individuals more readily ‘identify’ as meeting their child support 
obligations, and by helping raise perceptions that compliance is standard. For example, 
communications could include reminders that X per cent of parents pay on time; where 
possible, staff could preface discussions about non-payment with recognition of previous 
positive history (‘I’m calling because you’ve missed a payment, and I can see from your 
record that’s not like you).
• Tied to the above, helping parents ‘see’ the impact of the money they have provided 
may be beneficial – both in terms of inspiring confidence that the money is helping their 
child, and in terms of building a self-perception of having a history of positive support. For 
example, paying parents may be interested in ‘proof of payment’ or receipts to recognise 
support provided, or be receptive to communications which focused on the history of 
payments provided rather than money owed. 
• Paying parents would also likely welcome adjustments to liability calculations, or provision 
of alternative support arrangements, which recognise both financial support and provision 
of tangible goods. For those with an interest in supporting children but concerns about how 
money is spent, or a belief that money is not ‘required’ currently, there was also interest in 
alternatives such as ‘banking’ money in a child savings fund.
A visual summary of the potential opportunities, risks and potential levers is provided in 
Figure 5.1 below. 
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